Receiving Information in Confidence from Citizens

One problem we at HSM Training regularly encounter is that of how an agency can take information from a citizen in a secure and legally compliant way. Often within individual agencies a plethora of terms is used to try and cover the different circumstances in which a person provides information to a law enforcement agency. Terms such as: confidential informant, informer, informant, casual contact, confidential source, confidential contact, agent, CHIS, human source and even witness are often used interchangeably by members of an agency. Not only does this lead to much confusion it means the limited resources of the agency are often wasted with needless bureaucracy. More seriously, it can often mean that people who put themselves at risk by providing information are not properly protected by the agency.  

When it comes to passing information law enforcement needs to identify and use specific named categories into which they can place the individual who is supplying information. When placed in the identified category the agency can then manage that individual according to an agreed and document set of standards. Using identified clearly identified categories and working to agreed standards ensures that the risk to the person and the agency are managed effectively. They will also ensure that there is legal compliance.

There are three categories that command an adequate starting place all of which will fall within the broader understanding of the often, used term 'confidential informant'.

1. 'Registered Human Source.' This term refers to a person with whom an agency enters a relationship in order to obtain information over an identified period and under specified set of circumstances. This relationship is authorised by someone in a management position within the agency and all aspects of that relationship are documented. [In Canada, this term also includes a person who has “agent” status.]

2. 'Witness.' This term refers to a person with whom the agency enters into a relationship with the intention that the person will give evidence in court against another person. Such a person may or may not be serving a prison sentence at time of passing the information. The person knows they will be testifying.

3.  'Member of the public.' This term refers to all other persons that do not fall within either Category 1 or 2 above and refers to any person passing information to the law enforcement agency in the expectation that their identity remains confidential (i.e. the intention is the identity of this person will be protected except when there is a legal requirement to disclose it).
   

At HSM Training we work in many different jurisdictions with different legislative processes. However, we have yet to encounter a legislative regime where this method of classification will not work. This system may need minor tweaking but it will help you address this problem in a cost effective manner. If you need help with this problem please contact us at: info@hsmtraining.com  

Save yourself some time and trouble and get a system that protects everyone involved.

Undercover Policing - Training for the real world

At HSM Training we have been working recently with several psychologists who are actively involved in creating safe learning environments for officers engaged in such high-risk activities as undercover policing or managing human sources (confidential informants). Frequently, these psychologists are having to deal with the paradox that officers are being asked to operate in high-risk environments, but the agency’s training regime refuses to allow training that simulates real life.

With an increasing number of law enforcement educators advocating the stance that training should take place in an environment where officers are not allowed to feel uncomfortable, one where they will rarely be challenged as to their behaviour, and not even allowed to fail a course, there is a real problem as to how to get staff up to standard to operate safely in the real world.

Here are ten questions you might want to ask your training department when you talk to them about designing the type of training course that is required to keep officers safe:

1. In the real world will officers be asked to make decisions under pressure?

2. In the real world are officers likely to be subjected to verbal attacks?

3. In the real world will officers have to cope with significant, sometimes seemingly overwhelming, work load?

4. In the real world will officers encounter aggressive and offensive individuals?

5. In the real world will officers sometimes feel isolated and alone?

6. In the real world will officers potentially feel high levels of anxiety?

7. In the real world is the stress encountered likely to be prolonged and/or have a cumulative effect?

8. In the real world might someone could an error by an officer lead to their death?

9. Do you believe everyone can perform the role in question? (If the answer given to this is “neither” the person you are talking to does not know what they are talking about. Not everyone has the aptitude for specialised roles.)

10. Would you rather officers failed in the classroom or failed in the real world? (If the answer given to this is “neither” the person you are talking to does not know what they are talking about. If an officer’s vulnerabilities are not identified in the classroom they will be come out in the real world often with catastrophic consequences.)

Often, reluctance to build role appropriate training stems from fear: Fear of a complaint from a student, fear that the instructors themselves would not cope well with the type of training, or fear from those outside of the learning environment (such as managers or human resource staff) objecting to the nature of the training. It also shows a lack of knowledge of the law.

Failure to provide training that prepares an officer to deal with the real world they will encounter is a failure to protect the officer.  It is an ethically bankrupt strategy, based for the most part, in self-protection. Furthermore, it is negligence and where the risks faced may lead to the physical or mental harm such omissions may amount to an offence under Health and Safety or Workplace Safety legislation.

Muhammad Ali once said: “I hated every minute of training, but I said, 'Don't quit. Suffer now and live the rest of your life as a champion.”

For those involved in high risk police duties a shorter version suffices: “I hated every minute of training, but I said, 'Don't quit. Suffer now and live the rest of your life....”

At HSM Training we strive to provide training that ensures officers are ready to deal with the world they will face: Better hard training, than hard ending.

The Human Source Management System

When it comes to managing human sources ( confidential informants, HUMINT ) many of the problems that arise occur because staff involved do not work to a structured system. Our Human Source Management training is based on 4 behavioural models which create a structured pathway to recruit and manage a human source in the most effective and productive way while ensuring adherence to legal and ethical principles.
The first of these models (© Buckley and Reid 2005) The Human Source Management Framework is explained below. This model is supplemented by Targeting, Recruiting and Handling models.

The Human Source Management Framework ©

Need - This is where the intelligence requirement against which the source will gather information is identified.

This need generates two responses:

1. Planned Approach – An operation is planned to recruit a source. This will lead to the Targeting Stage

2. Unplanned Opportunity – An opportunity arises for the handler to attempt to recruit someone who can satisfy the need. This leads directly to the Recruiting Stage where the handler can employ the generic social psychology.

Targeting – The targeting of particular potential prospects. This is carried out at two levels social psychological information and the intelligence case. This will allow the handler to develop ‘Targeted Psychology’ for the individual. 

Recruiting – This is the recruitment stage where the handler interacts with the potential source with a view to getting the them to meet with the handler and become a source.

Handling – This stage takes the handler from the post recruitment meeting through the development process to the effective use of the source and ultimately to the termination of the source.

This simple model provides a structure that guides officers and can indicate what psychological techniques can be used to achieve the best results and when it is the best time to use them.

Details of the model and how to use it are contained in the publication The Human Source Management System ( see publications).

Sexual Misconduct with an informant

Interesting story about an officers inappropriate sexual relationship with an informant ("human source", "confidential informant", "covert human intelligence source")

https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/01/26/sex-harassment-settlement-minnesota-bca-informant

As always in these cases it is good to ask a few pertinent questions about the management of confidential informants and hopefully the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension is asking itself how this situation occurred.

1. What are the agency rules and regulations about contact with informants and how are contacts reported?
2. Was there only one officer managing this informant?
3. What supervision was there and what went wrong with it?
4. What training did the officers involved have for this highly specialised role?
5. What changes can the agency make to reduce the chances of this happening again?

It is easy to cast all the blame on one "bad apple" but if one wants to eradicate this type of behaviour one needs a full independent audit of what went wrong and not one carried out by people with a vested interest in sweeping the issue under the rug. 

Three things will help prevent this sort of event:

1. Comprehensive policy and procedures for officers involved in managing informants
2. Only trained officers involved to manage informants and those officers being properly trained.
3. Good IT to record and manage all the records.

If you want to know more get in touch we provide audits and training. And we are significantly cheaper than $110,000!

Power, police officers and the human brain

As a keen amateur photographer I enjoy spending some time browsing the photos posted on Instagram wishing I had the "eye" to have captured some of the amazing shots posted there. Inevitably, given my professional background, I do tend to drift to law enforcement photos and end up following some officers as they post their daily events on line.  I thought it worth raising what one officer had posted there. The photo related to giving citizens a ticket for not pulling over when a police car was trying to pass them in an emergency. The officer who owned the post said she often gave out "tickets" to motorists who failed to pull over. This raises the interesting question about when, and if, a police officer should use the powers they have been given and what will be the benefit or consequences of using these powers. 

Every police officer who has ever been en route to an emergency call with the "blues and twos" blasting, is well aware that the world is full of motorists who it feels are deliberately impeding the police vehicle. There they are driving along in their own little world, oblivious to what is behind them. And what is behind them is a police officer getting more and more stressed and more and more frustrated.

Now let's try and add a few facts to the situation that might help anyone involved:

1. As soon as the officer gets an emergency call, stress levels rise instantaneously. The activity in the brain changes significantly and the way the officer perceives the world changes.
2. In reality, the motorist is oblivious to all but what happens to be in their world, at that  particular moment. [Rarely do people deliberately try to impede the police in such a manner.]

Assuming that the police officer continues to the emergency, (if they don't their stress level has already removed the ability to think logically) and that they note the licence plate/vehicle number returning to speak with the motorist at a later time, what occurs then is:

1. The officer is still likely to be in an annoyed/frustrated state, whether they realise it or not.
2. The motorist may still be totally oblivious to what they have done. If they are aware the are likely to be:  a) Feel sorry for their actions,  and/or   b) feel that, as their actions were unintentional, an apology is sufficient to make it right. 
3. The officer decides to issue a ticket because that's what the frustration in their brain is telling them to do.
4. The police officer alienates a citizen.

Just because a police officer has the power does not mean they have to use it.  If the officer writes a ticket nothing is gained except the 'power buzz' for the officer. The motorist learns nothing, except resentment.

That said, how often do we equip officers with understanding of the human brain and how to develop their interpersonal skills to use that knowledge? The fault  often begins, not with the individual officer but with the training that is provided to them, when they are recruited.

Want to know more: ask about our basic interpersonal skills course? 

Countering Violent Extremism in Schools

HSM Training recently joined up with Imodality Australia (Imodality.com) and  Commission for International Justice and Accountability, US  (CIJA)  to deliver an awareness program relating to countering violent extremism. The lectures were delivered to a number of staff derived from the Albanian Education sector.  The training was delivered during a number of two day training events in Tirana, Albania and covered a basic understanding of terrorism and its root causes and the likely indicators of a school student being drawn into involvement in extremist behaviours.  This part of an inter agency approach to protecting vulnerable school students involving law enforcement, schools, social workers and psychologists.   If you are interested in further details please get in touch. 

Tragic and avoidable death of confidential informant leads to million dollar pay out by police

Here is a story that is unfortunately to common: the tragic and arguably avoidable death of someone who has agreed to be a confidential informant for law enforcement. Shelley Hillard was 19 year's old when she agreed to become a confidential informant after being caught with marijuana at a Detroit motel in 2011.

Follow this link for the story.

http://www.wacotrib.com/news/ap_nation/apnewsbreak-family-of-slain-informant-settles-for-m/article_10906239-59a9-5ac3-81e6-7d044738b635.html

First, as human beings we must acknowledge that a person has lost their life and that a family is grieving that loss.

Second, as law enforcement professionals we must take the opportunity to see if their are any lessons that can be learned from such events to prevent a recurrence with some other person.

Often these events occur through two major failings:

1. The agency does not have effective structures to manage confidential informantssafely. There is a lack of clear policy, record keeping is poor and supervision is far from adequate. INADEQUATE STRUCTURES = NEGLIGENCE
2. The officers are not trained to manage confidential informants. Managing a confidential informant is a difficult task and there are numerous things that can go wrong including a failure to protect the person, the development of a corrupt relationship, and poor evidence collection. All staff involved int eh management of confidential informants need training with regard to how to do this. And the training should meet minimum standards. Quite simply you cannot teach someone how to manage a confidential informant in one or two days. And if an officer  is not properly trained they should NOT be allowed to manage an confidential informant. NOT TRAINED = NEGLIGENCE

And if you are a Chief worried about the cost of improving your training and structures, if the ethical obligation does not work for you, then you might find motivation in the thought of paying out $1,000,000!

If you need expert guidance on the structures required to manage the risks with regard to confidential informants or want help with quality training please contact us at HSM Training and Consultancy. Or have a read at some of our related publications listed on this website. 

The risk from freedom of information requests - covert human intelligence sources

Many UK police services have to deal with the problem of ongoing requests from journalists under the Freedom of Information Act. While many of these journalists may be genuinely seeking information which will be of interest to their readers and which form part of living in a free and democratic society, a failure to deal with these requests in a professional manner creates a risk to both individual covert human intelligence sources (informants) and to sensitive methodology. 

North Yorkshire police recently refused a request and were very precise in their use of the correct legislation to legitimately refuse the request. Well done them!  See the following site:

https://northyorkshire.police.uk/access-to-information/foi-disclosure-log/covert-human-intelligence-source-payments-519-2017-18/

If a police service gives out to much detail it is quite possible for a person to be identified as a human source or for a person to be wrongly identified as a human source. I both such cases there is a real risk to the life of the person concerned. 

This risk is increased where journalists mount what is often referred to as a 'mosaic attack' where they send in a large number of separate requests for information in order to hide just how much information they are requesting.  If the member of the receiving police service is unaware of the nature of human source (CHIS) work or fails to identify the existence of a number of related requests then very sensitive methodology can be exposed. All the journalist has to do is put the answers from the number of requests together and put each piece in place as one would a jigsaw puzzle.This is a risk to policing throughout the UK as it is the same methodology that is used across the country. 

Police services need to recognise this risk, document it and put in place control measures to deal with it.

Active Listening for Police Officers

Many of have heard of the term "Active Listening" and some of us may have a vague recollection of attending some training entitled 'active listening' or some such moniker.  However, how much of what we were taught do we actually remember and how often do we put it into practice?

In delivering training to police officers on an international basis it is evident that many officers have little or no understanding of this basic skill that will help them do there job much more effectively and keep them much safer into the bargain. 

One problem with training in relation to active listening is that the theory is relatively easy to teach  - the main points can be covered in a few PowerPoint slides. This means that many Police Chiefs and Heads of Training are fooled into thinking that there officers have been trained in active listening.

Teaching a few theoretical points is not teaching someone how to listen effectively. Those new to the subject must learn how to use their ears and there eyes effectively.  Much of communication is visual.  They must be taught a basic understanding of what motivates human behaviour and they must be given significant time in role plays to practice and understand the application of their new skills. 

Investment in such training brings significant returns with regard to public confidence, enhanced community policing and effective policing.  The skill of active listening should be taught to all new police recruits and should run as a core theme throughout their initial training.  Introductory and refresher courses should be provided to other officers of all ranks. 

If you are interest in effective training designed specifically for police officers please get in touch with us at HSM Training.

Confidential Informant Audit Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

As some one who is always on the look out for material on how to better manage human sources (confidential informants) I came across this audit of some of the issues The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) have had in managing confidential informants. 

 SEE WEBSITE: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/a1717.pdf

For anyone involved in this business it is always good to read about what is and is not being done properly in other agencies. We should not be continuing to make the same mistakes. Take the time to read the full report and then check your own systems to ensure that you are not making the same mistakes.  Better do it now before you are audited or something else goes wrong and the lawyers come knocking at your door. 

Lets take a look at some of the recommendations here which I have paraphrased in more general terms. (My comments in italics)

• Develop and implement a record-keeping system sufficient to maintain, in a single location, complete and reliable CI information.  - This is essential for every agency. All confidential informant records should be held in a central location.
• Establish adequate procedures and controls within the system to ensure that all data is entered in a complete, consistent, and accurate manner, and that historical data is appropriately maintained.  Good training to manage informants and good supervision ensure good data entry.
• Ensure that the system requires the capture and validation of additional confidential informant related information to assist in managing the confidential informant program. There has been be a way to capture any information to help the agency improve its capacity when it comes to managing informants
• Implement a method to accurately and completely track all payment information for individual confidential informants. Money management is a serious concern in all CI programs. Good systems significantly reduce the risks to the officers and to the agency.

Managing confidential informants ( human sources ) is fraught with risk. Good systems reduce those risks. 

Managing Risk - Using a paedophile as an informant

There has been much written in the UK press recently about the use of a covert human intelligence source [CHIS]  (UK legal term for a confidential informant) in connection with a child abuse investigation.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/09/police-paid-convicted-child-rapist-10000-spy-asian-grooming/

Northumbria Police have come under substantial criticism for using a convicted child rapist to provide information on a group of paedophiles preying on young girls in the area.  18 people were convicted as a result of the investigation. 

Much,  if not all of, the criticism has been ill informed. While the specifics of the management of the human source have, of necessity for his safety, remained secret one can speak in general terms about the management of any human source under such circumstances.

When managing any human source one must balance the risks of adopting a course of action against the benefits to be gained. However, what is often forgotten about is the risk of not doing something. In this case, there were risks in managing a source who has serious previous convictions for sexual assault and this had to be balanced against the benefit that could be gained from obtaining his information namely the prevention of further sexual assaults taking place and the conviction of offenders. That in itself is a fairly strong case for using the source, however distasteful it may be. But what if we choose the path of not using the source - we accept that there is a very high probability the offending will continue and many other children will be subjected to a high degree of physical and mental harm.  We allow the sexual abuse of children to continue because we feel bad about paying someone money for information.  

Chief Constable Steve Ashman was right to authorise the use of this human source and should be praised for his robust defence of the tactic. What the public should be more concerned about is the fact that there are senior officers out there who would not authorise the use of a human source under these circumstances. Such a risk averse approach means that offending of this type which could be stopped is not stopped. 

This type of scenario is one I often raise in our training on managing risk in covert operations as it causes students to open their minds and  understand what effective risk management is about.  If you are interested in risk management training for using human sources (confidential informants) we have a two day course which covers this and many other topics and provides a robust defensible system for managing risk.   For further reading see our publication:  Invest Now or Pay Later  - The Management of Risk in Covert Law Enforcement.  If you have any comments or questions please get in touch. 

Ten things you might want to consider when auditing your Confidential Informant Management System

In a previous article we highlighted the need for audit of the systems for managing confidential informants.  Here at HSM training we believe in providing solutions so we are giving you a few points to set you in the right direction.

For many agencies the task of managing confidential informants is a task that is routinely carried by their staff on a daily with little apparent need for checking as to how well the system in place is actually functioning.  A mindset will often prevail that as long as things appear to be operating without a problem then there is no need to potentially upset the apple-cart by actually checking to see if they are. All too often anyone that suggests such an action is perceived as working to some personal agenda or inferring that the staff are doing something wrong. Carrying out an audit of how confidential informants are being managed within an agency involves looking at the informant management system as a whole and examining how individual informants are being managed on a case specific basis. I often find that within any agency’s confidential informant processes there are often good things and bad and while finding the good is always reassuring finding the bad has left many a Chief with a few sleepless nights.

‘Ten things’ that should make you think about carrying out an audit are:

1.       It is better to do your own audit now, rather than such an audit being carried out in the public domain. It would not be the first time that an agency’s methodology was subject to public scrutiny as a result of judicial proceedings or public pressure.

2.       You will find wrong-doing. The extent of such wrong-doing will vary from minor failings in record keeping to potentially criminal wrong doing. It is better for all that corrective measures are quickly put in place for the minor issues and that any major ones are expeditiously investigated.

3.       You will find misinterpretation and misunderstandings of the agency’s informant policies. Many police policies are poorly written and open to misinterpretation, this leaves the agency, its members and the public vulnerable.  Finding short-comings in policy at an early stage means that corrections can be made before harm results.

4.       You will find people that are being managed as if they were confidential informants but that the officers involved have never properly documented as such. This is one of the major origins of risk with regard to informant management.

5.       You will discover which officers are being productive and which officers are merely talking the talk when it comes to managing informant.

6.       You will find confidential informants that are being productive and which are merely talking the talk.  You may also find a few informants that your agency really should have nothing to do with because they are very likely to cause harm to the agency in the longer term.

7.       You will find significant amounts of information submitted from informants never gets to where it needs to go to and istherefore not properly auctioned by the agency. When something does go wrong there is very little that will make an agency look quite as bad as the discovery that there was information available prior to the event that could have prevented the event.

8.       You will find where informants can be much more effectively managed and tasked against identified priorities.  Those managing informants need to take cognizance of the limited resources available to law enforcement and be more circumspect in the time and effort that are expended in managing confidential informants.  Few agencies manage their informants in a proactive way that meets the well recognized principles of intelligence led policing.

9.       You will find inconsistencies, often significant ones, in the way informants are paid or rewarded across the agency.  If there is more than one person responsible for financial management of informant rewards then there is very likely to be a difference in what is being paid out , to who and for what. If you find that there is not an efficient way of tracking informant money across the agency then be prepared for the worst.

10.   If you find the potential problems before they are real problems then you will have a much happier Chief and you will have done a professional job.

People are often reluctant to undertake an audit out of fear for what they may find or because of the hostility with which such an undertaking may be met.  If carrying out an initial audit it can be well worth well to examine all the agency’s informants and decide which ones are worth reregistering and which ones the agency should cease contact with; starting again in this way means that the agency is at significantly less risk than before such an audit. Start with an initial audit of the informant management system and then pencil one in on an annual basis. If you find that audit is all but impossible because the agency’s informant records are all over the place well that is the first thing you may want to speak to the Chief about the problem.

Assessing the source of intelligence in intelligence reports

Has the UK College of Policing got it wrong on evaluating intelligence?

https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/intelligence-management/intelligence-report/#source-evaluation

It is with reluctance that I would critique policing policy but a read through the UK College of Policing guidance on intelligence reports begs comment. Remembering that this is the guidance for all the police in the UK it is worth reading with a critical eye.

Under the heading of "Intelligence report"  we find the comment "The source of the information can be either the name and address of the person providing the information..."   

Comment 1: A completed intelligence report should never contain any details of who has provided the information from which the report is constructed. It should contain a unique reference number that links back to the original information submission. At all times the origin of the intelligence should be as well protected as possible. What they are suggesting here has implications under Article 2 ECHR  and the right to life. What is suggested in the guidance should not be considered as a reasonable measure to protect the life of someone giving information in confidence to police.

Under the words source evaluation we have:

"Source evaluation:  1. Reliable  2. Untested  3. Unreliable."  

Comment 2 This is the lazy option and a very dangerous one. The excuse often given for abandoning the previous matrix was people didn't understand it.  People didn't understand it because it was not trained to them and because supervisors did not supervise the quality of reports.  Reducing it to three values makes little sense.  What about the person who is reliable sometimes? Are they different from someone who we think is malicious in their reporting? These things matter. These evaluations help decision makers make good decisions and these are bad values. One wonders who or what was the driving force to change them particularly given the lack of consultation and the fact that many forces can't use them because of IT issues. 

There is much more to be said about the quality of this guidance but reading through it I am rapidly losing the will to live. There is so much in it that is flawed and poorly written. UK policing deserve better.

 I could write a book on the issues around information submissions and intelligence reports - actually I did - so if you want to know how manage this process in a much safer and efficient way than this have a read at the book:  Managing Intelligence - A guide for Law Enforcement Professionals. 

Or contact:  HSM Training for further information about our training. 

Ten things that should be done to address civil liberty issues when working with intelligence

Concerns around intelligence gathering activities by law enforcement are always of concern to citizens. In some cases one only has to mention the word ‘intelligence’ and people have visions of an Orwellian state. When it comes to intelligence led policing and activities associated with it, the public have a right to keep a watching eye on what law enforcement are doing but for the most part the average law abiding citizen has nothing to be concerned about. Law enforcement has neither the interest nor the resources to go prying into an innocent person’s life.

However, when it comes to preserving public order and investigating crime there is always the potential for the engagement of civil liberties and law enforcement agencies must have in place structures to prevent the civil liberty violations. The topic of civil liberties is by its very nature a broad one which can impact a citizen in many ways. These include matters pertaining to freedoms of association and travel (both of which are engaged if law enforcement carry out any form of surveillance on a person), to the right of an accused to have a fair trial.  When a law enforcement agency adopts an ‘intelligence led policing’ approach there will always be an engagement with civil liberties but this does not mean that there will be a violation of civil liberties provided the agency has in place the structures to avoid such.

1.       The agency must have in place a process to manage all covert activities where the civil liberty issues arise. Separate but similar processes will be required for activities such as undercover operations, surveillance, interception of communications and managing a confidential informant. In some instances legislation may require that a warrant is sworn. The authorization process is intended to complement, not replace such a requirement.

2.       An officer should complete a written application prior to carrying out any operation likely to have an impact on the civil liberties of any person. This application should include a summary of the matter being investigated, how the person whose rights will be engaged is linked to that investigation and the nature of the activity that is proposed. This application should be forwarded to an officer of an appropriate rank whose responsibility it is to authorise such activity. This would normally be someone of captain rank or equivalent.

3.       The application must show why the activity that is proposed is necessary to achieve the aims of the investigation. In order to prove necessity the officer must state why other less intrusive and more traditional means of investigation have failed or are likely to fail. The application should include a detailed risk assessment including risks to both the public and any confidential informant that is involved.

4.       The authorizing officer should examine the application and set parameters for the intelligence gathering operation. These limits should include the nature of the activity that is permitted and the duration of that activity.

5.       Where the nature of the activity is more intrusive a higher level of authorization should be in place.  This would be required for example in deploying an undercover officer into a place of worship or where a juvenile confidential informant is used.

6.       The agency must keep comprehensive records of all operations. These records should be kept in a central location. Officers should not be allowed to keep records pertaining to intelligence collection under their own control.

7.       All records should be kept to evidential standards. Given that the primary goal of most intelligence gathering operations will be to ultimately bring the perpetrators to trial, all records with regard to operations should meet evidential standards. This ensures a citizen’s rights to a fair trial.

8.       At the termination of the operation all records should be examined to ensure that any intelligence collected has been legally collected. This review should also ensure that the maximum amount of information has been processed into intelligence and is stored legally.

9.       There should be regular audit of all covert operations to ensure that the agency is not unlawfully engaging civil liberties. Audits should be carried out by a person independent of the operation.

10.   Statistical data relating to the nature of covert operations and the results of those operations should be readily available at any time, for the head of the agency. Monitoring what is being a done, by whom and what it is achieving is just one way of reducing the risk of officers being drawn into situation where citizen’s rights are violated.

When it comes to an agency adopting an intelligence led policing strategy, these simple steps ensure that a law enforcement agency has adopted a proactive approach to addressing civil liberty issues that provides reassurance to the citizen’s it has undertaken to protect. Furthermore, It is always worth remembering there are always defence lawyers out there willing to exploit any vulnerability to gain an acquittal - cases should not be lost because of poor law enforcement processes. The steps mentioned above significantly mitigate the risk of cases being dismissed purely because of an alleged civil liberty violation.

HSM Training and Consultancy work with law enforcement and intelligence agencies on an international basis addressing civil liberty issues in the intelligence environment and can provide expert testimony in related cases.

Independent Auditing of Informant Management

  Here is a story of a police department potentially in trouble.  http://www.kentucky.com/news/state/article121045333.html

The time to get someone to audit your informant policies, methods and training is before something bad happens. There is nothing to fear from an independent audit provided you chose the right person to do it. In fact it goes along way to protecting your agency. Leaving it to after a bad event is akin to bolting the stable door after the horse has bolted. 

Any good audit will cover both the way you manage your confidential informants and the way the subsequent intelligence is managed. Managing confidential informants (human sources) is a risky business and few agencies have the internal expertise to audit their system effectively.  Setting aside the obvious biases likely to occur with an internal audit, auditing an confidential informant management system requires both breadth and depth of expertise. 

Many agencies choose to keep their proverbial heads buried in the sand fooling themselves that everything is OK and that they are legally and ethically compliant. This attitude has little validity. if you are a Police Chief make sure you are asking the right people lots of difficult questions about how your agency is managing confidential informants (human sources) and think about getting an independent audit.