Undercover operations - Records and accountability and potential corruption

“Cops bought booze, lap dances during undercover strip club probe…” makes for an interesting headline in the New York Post but the whole story raises a lot of questions for the police department involved. More importantly it creates a learning opportunity for other law enforcement agencies when it comes to accountability and record keeping in undercover operations.  In short what occurred seems to be that Tampa police ‘undercover’ officers’ went to a Gentlemen’s Club, or more accurately described as a strip club, to investigate allegations that the girls were selling sex to customers. But here there is also the claim that they went there to get information from a dancer about a shooting. Looking at this from a perspective of working in undercover / covert operations for over 35 years, this is where the story breaks down for me. You don’t try and do many things covertly at one time. Either the officers went to the club to debrief or recruit a confidential informant, or a potential witness, or the officers went their to carry out an undercover operation to investigate alleged prostitution. And then, they are also claiming that they went to make narcotics arrests. Trying to combine any of these is foolish and demonstrates a lack of understanding of the risks involved in any aspect of what they are doing. There are so many things wrong in what occurred here it is hard to know where to start but let’s look at a few key points:

First, I would suggest meeting any informant (Confidential human source, CHIS) in their place of work is fraught with danger. Was this dancer a registered informant or not? If not, why did the officers think she would give up information? And if there was a reason for her to provide information,  why did they approach her in her place of work and not at some other location?

Second, did they want this dancer to become a witness? Again why was there a need to approach her at this location? It puts her at significant risk. Why did the officers not recognize this risk? What protection were they providing to a potential withness?

Third, if this was a legitimate undercover operation, who authorized this operation? It is bad practice for a first line supervise to authorize such activity. I would suggest such activity should be authorized in writing by someone of the rank equivalent of at least a Major and given the additional ethical risk involved in an operation in a strip bar I would recommend a higher rank. Another question that certainly jumps to mind is how many of the officers involved had completed an undercover officer’s training course and what was the nature and duration of that course? It is hubris to think that any detective can carry out such work effectively and safely and without training. Undercover police work is a specialized role. It is not dressing like someone from Hill Street Blues or The Wire and rocking up to some dingy bar.

Fourth, this also raises questions about the processes in place within the agency with regard to recording such activities. There should be a comprehensive procedures and records for any type of covert operation, be it an undercover operation or the meeting with a confidential informant. If the officers were present to interview a person about a shooting then the investigating officer should have task them in writing, and there should be a record of that. Procedures and records minimize the risk of corruption. Here the agency failed.

Fifth, it would be pertinent to ask how many units of alcohol were consumed? Were the officers armed? And who was driving?

Sixth, the fact that officers gave conflicting stories as to why they were there raises serious concerns about the validity of any claims made. It also raises serious questions about the suitability of the officers to remain in any detective role.

In short, this is such a hotch-potch of an operation and the fact that such activity has occurred means that there are strong indicators of flaws in a number of systems within this law enforcement agency including intelligence management, investigation, undercover operations and managing confidential informants. All these should be subjected to a full independent audit. Too often the temptation is to blame it on a few bad apples or a few misguided soles. In this case the punishment would seem to indicate it is regarded as a case of ‘boys will be boys’, as opposed to be viewed as serious incompetence or corruption.

And in case anyone thinks I am being unduly hard on these officers or on this agency, I am willing to audit their systems at no charge. Better things are put right that the reputation of policing is further damaged. And let me know what you think in the comments below.

If you think that your agency could run into similar problems such as these, get in touch before it happens. These things are easily fixed if you have the know-how. Much better fix it before ending up in the New York Post, or with an officer or member of the public killed or injured. Contact us on info@hsmtraining.com or call us on +44 7739370969  Let us help you protect your community more safely and more effectively.

Alternatively, if you just would like to hear an unexpurgated view of this incident just give me a call.